DeLanda and Protevi Discussion

I came across this excellent discussion between Manuel DeLanda and John Protevi, which is called Deleuzian Interrogations (PDF file).

It is interesting how Protevi argues the philosophy division should not be drawn between "continental vs analytic", but instead "realist vs anti-realist". So who are the non-realists? DeLanda, when speaking about literary criticism and cultural studies departments, lists the non-realists as social constructivists, idealists, and postmodern semiotics. Now this is interesting, as throughout DeLanda's writings, and presentations for the European Graduate School, he firmly claims Deleuze is a realist. In Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy DeLanda writes:

"When confronted with Deleuze's orginal texts this audience (i.e. analytical philosophers) is bound to be puzzled, and may even be repelled by the superficial similarity of these texts with books belonging to what has come to be known as the "post-modern" tradition. Although as I argue in these pages Deleuze has nothing in common with that tradition" (p3)

DeLanda latter goes onto claim:

There are philosophers who grant reality full autonomy from the human mind, disregarding the difference between the observable and the unobservable, and the anthropocentricism this distinction implies. These philosophers are said to have a realist ontology. Deleuze is such a realist philosopher, a fact that by itself should distinguish him from most post-modern philosophers which remain basically non-realist (p4)

Now, with the idea/argument Deleuze is not a post-modern philosopher I completely agree. If anything, his books are aimed moving 'us' through the post-modern impasse. However, throughout DeLanda's books there is usually kind references to Michel Foucault. The question is where does this leave Michel Foucault on the realist/anti-realist divide?

Foucault Quote

I came across this nice quote from Foucault in a interview entitled 'Question of Method' in volume 3 of the essential work - Power:

'I wouldn't want what I may have said or written to be seen as laying claims to totality. I don't try to universalize what I say; conversely, what I don't say isn't meant to be thereby disqualified as being of no importance...I like to open up a space of research, try it out, and then if it doesn't work, try again somewhere else...My book aren't treatise in philosophy or studies of history; at most, they are philosophical fragments put to work in a historical field of problems.' (p224)

The attraction of work not either being totalising or neither unimportant becomes an appealing trait for social science research. Three particular reasons stood out. One, there appears a lot of modesty in this method and perspective, claiming research is not the final and complete word on the subject matter, but rather arguing particular research has significance and relevance. Second, and related to the first, the fragmentary nature of the research hints at the perspectivism a particularly piece of research inherently contains. I tend to think of this as the place of discourse analysis and deconstruction, which don't claim to totality, but rather pose relevant issues and concerns about language, especially when other thinkers basically put a lot of their faith in the possibility of communication as a route to emancipation. Third, the emphasis on experimentation and possible failure, where the researcher actually experiments with a particular theory or method, for example, in order to produce research, but also crucially to transform themselves and society.